Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data

Citizens are willing to abandon their short-term financial interest in free-riding considerably, if governments act in their interest, if procedures of the public decisions-making process are felt to be fair and if other fellow-citizens have to contribute also an adequate share to the community. In such a situation trustworthiness of a government and trust in a government is high. This paper provides empirical evidence that trust is crucial for fiscal performance using data for the full sample of Swiss cantons over the 1981-2001 period. In cantons with high levels of trust, the level of indebtedness is significantly lower. Trust supports fiscal discipline. In order to get a useful approximation for mutual trust among citizens and between citizens and their representatives, we use information from direct voter participation on political issues (initiatives and public referenda) held in Swiss state (cantonal) governments. Electoral support of government proposals reveals an important aspect of trust in a real world setting. Hence, our trust variable measures the behavior at the ballots thereby reducing possible subjective biases derived from surveys and questionnaires.Trust, Social capital, Fiscal performance, Indebtedness

Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History: A Comment on Becker and Woessmann

This comment makes a contribution to Becker and Woessmann’s paper on a human capital theory of Protestant economic history eventually challenging the famous thesis by Max Weber who attributed economic success to a specific Protestant work ethic (Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2) (2009) forthcoming). The authors argue for a human capital approach: higher literacy among Protestants of the 19th century (and not a Protestant work ethic) contributed to higher economic prosperity at that point in history. However, the paper leaves the question open as to whether a Protestant specific work ethic existed or exists at all. Are there observable denomination-based differences in work ethic or is Protestantism only a veil hiding the underlying role of education? We use recent data to explore the role of Protestantism on work ethic. The results indicate that today’s work ethic in fact is influenced by denomination-based religiosity and also education.Religion, Work Ethic, Protestantism, Education

Fiscal Adjustment and the Costs of Public Debt Service: Evidence from OECD Countries

We use a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 to investigate the effects of different fiscal adjustment strategies on long-term interest rates – a key fiscal indicator reflecting the costs of government debt service. A government confronted with high deficits and rising debt will sooner or later need to enact fiscal adjustments in order to avoid solvency problems. Over the last four decades, such measures taken by governments in OECD countries have varied in duration, size, composition and in their success to re-establish fiscal sustainability. Controlling for various economic, fiscal and political factors, we find that the size and the composition of a fiscal adjustment significantly affect interest rates as well as yield spreads. Adjustments that are relatively large and those that primarily depend on expenditure cuts lead to substantially lower long-term interest rates. However, periods of fiscal adjustments do not generally have an influence on interest rates, even if they were successful and led to lower deficits and debt levels. Instead, financial markets only seem to value strict and decisive measures – a clear sign that the government’s pledge to cut the deficit is credible.fiscal adjustment, consolidation policy, government debt, deficit, interest rates

Are Fiscal Adjustments less Successful in Decentralized Governments?

A common political claim is that decentralized governments undermine policy makers’ ability to fight fiscal imbalance. This paper examines how different fiscal institutions influence the likelihood of a successful fiscal adjustment. Using a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1981 to 2001, we first analyze the episodes of tight fiscal policy and their macroeconomic consequences. Then, we empirically investigate the determinants of successful long-lasting deficit reductions. Contrary to the popular claim, we find that fiscal decentralization increases the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation. In addition, the results point to an important role of intergovernmental grants and the circumstances, in particular the size of fiscal imbalance in the years before the consolidation in determining a successful adjustment policy. Furthermore, coalition governments and large parliaments less likely implement successful fiscal stabilizations. Finally, there is some weak evidence that spending cuts are more promising in reaching a long-lasting fiscal adjustment than revenue increases.fiscal adjustment, consolidation policy, fiscal decentralization, fiscal institutions

Voters as a hard budget constraint: On the determination of intergovernmental grants

Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referendum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of state interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.Budget Referendums, Intergovernmental Grants, Interest Group Influence.

Political Stability and Fiscal Policy - Time Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849

This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series ana-lysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger the longer the time-horizon of a respective term. In addition, a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office normally enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parlia-ment, the administration and the interest groups to influence policy decisions. In contrast, fre-quent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister.political stability, fiscal policy, constitutional changes

On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland

Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the com-petitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur where budget referendums are possible. The reason for this result is that budget referendums reduce the extent to which pro-centralization regions can commit to a low level of spending delegating the centralization choice to elected poli-cymakers. In addition, it reduces the ability of higher level policy-makers to attract additional responsibilities in order to gain policy discretion. Empi-rical findings from a panel data analysis for Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 support this hypothesis.centralization, fiscal federalism, budget referendums

Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional institutions. We distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. Theoretically, they both describe the degree to which the costs of spending decisions are internalized by individual decision-makers. In addition, we evaluate whether constitutional rules for executive and legislation as well as budget rules shape the size of government and how the different rules interact with fragmentation in determining government size. The empirical study of the role of fragmented governments for fiscal policy outcomes is based on a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 period. The results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is negatively associated with fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the fiscal referendum does effectively restrict the fiscal commons problem, but less successfully than the budget rule.Fragmentation, Fiscal Policy, Referendums, Legislative Rules, Budget Rules

Local Autonomy, Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is also a bottom-up approach such as, for example, decentralizing the political power to those who are close to the problems. Thus, this paper analyses the relationship between local autonomy and tax morale or the size of the shadow economy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data of the size of the shadow economy to systematically analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland, a country where the degree of federalism varies across different cantons. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).Tax Morale; Shadow Economy; Tax Compliance; Tax Evasion; Local Autonomy; Federalism; Institution

With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is also a bottom-up approach: decentralizing the political power to those who are close to the problems and give them a direct political say. This paper analyses the impact of direct democracy and local autonomy on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy. We use two different data sets on tax morale at the individual level (World Values Survey and International Social Survey Programme), and macro data of the size of the shadow economy to systematically analyse the effects of institutions in Switzerland, a country where participation rights and the degree of federalism vary across different cantons. The findings suggest that direct democratic rights and local autonomy, have a significantly positive effect on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy.Tax Morale, Shadow Economy, Tax Compliance, Tax Evasion, Direct Democracy, Local Autonomy